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Agenda
 The Journey
 Current S&MA Oversight/Insight 
Model
 The Change
 The Issue
 Potential NASA relationship with 
Commercial Partners
 Commercial “X” FRR – Are you Go
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Shuttle FRR - Are you Go?
 “There has to be an optimum balance 
among technical performance, time 
schedule and cost.”                                                                                                          
Dr. Eberhard Rees - Director of Marshall Space Flight Center (March 1, 1970 
- Jan. 19, 1973 ) – speaking to the World Management Congress in Munich in 
1972
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The Journey
 Following the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, the Rogers 
Commission reported in 1986:
• S&MA was not included in technical issue discussions.
• Inadequate S&MA staffing at MSFC – “Reductions in the safety, 
reliability and quality assurance work force at Marshall and NASA 
Headquarters have seriously limited capability in those vital functions 
(safety program responsibility) to ensure proper communications.”
“A properly staffed, supported, and robust safety
organization might well have avoided these faults
(addressing faults within the S&MA organization 
that contributed to the Challenger Accident)….” 
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Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) reported in 2003:
• “Throughout its history, NASA has
consistently struggled to achieve
viable safety programs and adjust
them to the constraints and vagaries
of changing budgets”
• “The Board believes that the safety
organization, due to a lack of capability
and resources independent of the Shuttle 
Program, was not an effective voice in 
discussing technical issues or mission operations pertaining to STS-107.”
The Journey (cont.)
Marshall Space Flight Center
8Marshall Space Flight Center
Current NASA Oversight/Insight
Model
Level II
Level III
Level IV
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Technical Authority
• AS9100 Registration / Compliance
• Procurement Quality
• Hardware Qualification &  Acceptance 
• Manufacturing & Test Quality
• Assure Requirement Compliance
• Control of Nonconforming Material
• Industrial Safety Monitoring
• Program Critical Hardware Moves
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• Flight Readiness (Element Reviews, Launch 
Support, Post-Flight Assessment)
• Material Review Board Disposition
• FMEA / CIL / Hazard Reports Approval & Safety 
Panel Reviews
• Design Reviews/Technical Interchange Meetings
• Contract Monitoring and Evaluation
• Change Evaluation/Boards
• NSRS / Safety Concern Reporting
• COQ Approval
• Problem Reporting and Corrective Action 
• Failure / Mishap Investigations
• Contractor and Subcontractor Audit / 
Assessments
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Current S&MA Oversight/Insight
Model
S&MA actively participates in the SSP Flight Certification process
 NSTS 08117, Appendix Q  identifies the flight readiness endorsement statements 
that MSFC S&MA must certify
 In summary, MSFC S&MA certifies flight readiness for the following areas:
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Space Shuttle S&MA Flight Readiness 
Certification
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Hazard Analyses Surveillance LCC’s
FMEA/CIL As-built vs. As-designed IFA’s
Design Verification NCR’s / PRACA’s Waiver’s/ Dev’s
Risk Analysis (e.g., PRA) MRB’s Limited Life Items
Audits GMIP’s Acceptance Reviews
GIDEP’s 
MSFC S&MA’s ability to certify the above endorsements requires 
active participation in each of the above areas
NASA FY11 Key Budget Points 
• $6 billion increase over five years to spur the development of 
American commercial human spaceflight vehicles and increase 
technical innovation
• Intends to cancel the Constellation program including Ares I, 
Ares V, Orion and Altair
• Adds $600 million to fund the Shuttle’s remaining flights, with 
funds available to extend Shuttle through the first quarter of 
FY2011, if necessary
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The Change
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 What should be the NASA S&MA role with respect to 
commercially developed launch vehicles/spacecraft 
flying NASA crews?
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The Issue
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“Let’s face it, space is a risky business.  I 
always considered every launch a barely 
controlled explosion.”
Aaron Cohen, Former JSC Center Director, Acting NASA Deputy 
Administrator, 1992
2/26/10
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Commercial Vehicle X FRR
Are you Go?
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Launch Vehicle 
Human-Rating Certification Fundamentals
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1. Define a requirements set that would yield an “acceptable level of 
safety”
2. Assurance that the design solution meets these requirements
3. Assurance that products (h/w and s/w) are consistent with the approved 
(deemed acceptable) design solutions
4. Flight test demonstrations to build confidence prior to initial launch of NASA 
crews
5. Complete a Flight Readiness certification process
6. Post-flight assessment process is in place
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Amount of NASA Oversight/Insight 
Things to Consider
 Quality issues with DOD Aerospace products 
 Ever increasing issues with counterfeit parts
 Experience/Track Record of Commercial Vendor  
• Toyota
 Production capability limitations
• Production rate
• Infrastructure  availability 
 Roll of other Federal Government Agencies - FAA
 Demonstrated reliability of vehicle
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Demonstrated Reliability vs 
Insight/Oversight
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What is the proper balance? 
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Demonstrated Reliability
Experience
Role of other Government Agencies
NASA Insight
NASA Oversight
NASA Requirements
Commercially 
viable space 
craft  that  can 
safely fly NASA 
Astronauts and 
passengers
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Can you answer the 
Go – No Go question?
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Questions?
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 “If eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, 
then chronic unease is the price of safety.”
Professor James Reason
